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Criminal Procedure: Intervening Change in Law
Voiding Regulation Under Which Petitioner Is
Convicted Held Cognizable in Collateral Proceedings
Failing to appear as ordered for a pre-induction physical ex-
amination, petitioner Davis was declared "delinquent"' by his
local draft board and ordered to report for induction. 2 When
Davis did not appear at the time specified, he was prosecuted
and convicted under the Military Service Act of 1967.3 While
Davis's appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court determined in Gutknecht v. United
States4 that the selective service regulations which permitted the
accelerated induction of delinquent registrants5 were without
adequate guidelines and punitive in nature.6 Although the court
of appeals remanded Davis's case for reconsideration in light of
Gutknecht,7 neither the district court nor the court of appeals
on review found that Davis's conviction was affected.8 Subse-
quently in United States v. Fox,9 the same court of appeals inter-
1. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1967) was in effect at the time of the rul-
ing by Davis's local board and provided in pertinent part:
Whenever a registrant has failed to perform any duty or duties
required of him under the selective service law other than the
duty to comply with an Order to Report for Induction...
or the duty to comply with an Order to Report for Civilian
Work... the local board may declare him to be a delinquent.
There were, in fact, two grounds on which Davis's delinquency status
was based: his failure to report for physical examination pursuant to
32 C.F.R. § 1641.4 (1967) and his failure to keep the local board apprised
of his current mailing address as required by 32 C.F.R. § 1641.7(a)
(1967).
2. Under 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1967), registrants declared delinquent
could be assigned first priority in order of induction, regardless of their
status prior to the delinquency declaration.
3. [A]ny person ... who ... shall knowingly fail or neglect
or refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the
execution of this title .... or rules, regulations, or directions
made pursuant to this title ... shall, upon conviction in any
district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a
fine of not mor6 than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment.
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
4. 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. 396 U.S. at 306-07.
7. United States v. Davis, 432 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1970).
8. United States v. Davis, 447 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
9. 454 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1971).
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preted the Gutknecht decision as rendering invalid the delin-
quency regulations under which Davis had 'been convicted. 10 Af-
ter commencing his prison sentence, Davis filed a motion under
section 2255 of the Judicial Code," claiming that the court of
appeals had effected a change in the law of the Ninth Circuit
which required that his sentence be vacated. The district court
denied Davis's motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, indicat-
ing that the change in the decisional law of the circuit could
not be raised collaterally, since the issue had been litigated on
direct appeal.' 2 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an
intervening change in decisional law invalidating, on nonconsti-
tutional grounds, the regulations under which a prisoner has
been convicted is cognizable in a collateral proceeding under sec-
tion 2255. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).18
10. It is unclear whether the holding in Gutknecht actually invali-
dated the delinquency regulations under all circumstances or merely ren-
dered them void when applied punitively. The majority opinion in Da-
vis read Gutknecht as rendering void the delinquency regulations under
which Davis was convicted. Justice Powell, in his separate opinion,
stated that the holding in Gutknecht "invalidated those regulations only
insofar as they were applied punitively to advance the date of a regis-
trant's induction or to deprive him of procedural rights, that he had not
waived." Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 348 (1974). Petitioner's
argument that Fox represented an intervening change in law would, thus,
be unsupportable under Justice Powell's interpretation of Gutknecht. The
issue remains largely unresolved, although several courts have given
Gutknecht the same interpretation as the Fox court. See Zack v. Benson,
454 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1971); Kelly v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 500
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). For a more extensive analysis of the Gutknecht case,
see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 222 (1970) and
Note, Accelerated Induction-The End of the Old Fast Shuffle: Gut-
knecht v. United States, 4 LoYoLA U.L. REv. 408 (1971).
11. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was with-
out jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which im-
posed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
ii the court finds ... that the sentence imposed was not
authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that
there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment
aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant
a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
12. United States v. Davis, 472 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1972).
13. Collateral petitions based on intervening changes in law fre-
quently involve consideration of two closely intertwined issues: (1)
whether the change in law is to be retroactively applied, see Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965), and (2) whether the petition is cog-
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The Court disagreed with the determination of the court of
appeals that a rejection of a claim on direct review is "the law
of the case" and precludes collateral consideration of the same
issue. 14 Relying on the language of two section 2255 cases,15 the
majority indicated that collateral review would be available
when a change in law occurs after affirmance of a conviction,
even though the legal issue has been determined against the peti-
tioner on appeaL 6  Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
reasoned that the language, legislative history, and purpose of
section 2255 suggested that claims of a nonconstitutional nature
were within the statute's intended scope.17 The Court qualified
its holding, however, with the requirement that the claim be one
which "presents exceptional circumstances" justifying collateral
review.18
Section 2255 was enacted to relieve federal courts of the
nizable in collateral proceedings, see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333, 341 n.12 (1974). The resolution of each issue generally depends on
the degree of prejudice the petitioner is likely to sustain if relief is de-
nied. Id. at 346-47. Cf. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961);
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181 (1947). The Davis majority was careful
to avoid decision of the retroactivity issue. 417 U.S. at 341 n.12.
As a finding of prejudice is generally central to both determinations,
it might be argued that the Court's decision to recognize the availability
to Davis of collateral proceedings predetermined the resolution of the re-
troactivity issue on remand. It appears, however, that certiorari was
granted in Davis so that the Court might define the scope of relief avail-
able under section 2255 and prevent lower courts from summarily dispos-
ing of nonconstitutional claims without considering the degree of preju-
dice involved.
14. 417 U.S. at 342.
15. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
16. 417 U.S. at 342. Although the majority regarded passages from
Kaufman and Sanders, quoted in note 56 infra, as holdings, the language
can hardly be considered such in the strict sense of that term. Further-
more, the applicability of these cases to the situation in Davis is question-
able, as neither case dealt with a change in law of a nonconstitutional
nature. See note 56 infra.
17. 417 U.S. at 342-45. Although another equally convincing inter-
pretation of the statutory language was available, see note 30 infra, the
majority failed to recognize the ambiguities of the statute or to buttress
its opinion by relying more heavily on the strong, independent policies
supporting its holding.
18. 417 U.S. at 346-47. The importance of this qualifying language
may well be overlooked. The "exceptional circumstances" language is
separated from the holding it was intended to limit-that nonconstitu-
tional claims are properly cognizable under section 2255-and for this
reason its role as a qualification on the cognizability of a nonconstitu-
tional claim may not be readily apparent. Moreover, the phrase itself
is ambiguous enough that difficulties of interpretation may discourage its
application. But see United States v. Travers, No. 74-1737 (2d Cir., Dec.
16, 1974), discussed in note 68 infra.
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burden that had resulted from the administration of habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction. Previously a federal prisoner instituting a ha-
beas corpus action had to file his motion in the district of his con-
finement. As a result, those courts with major federal peniten-
tiaries in their territorial jurisdictions were forced to dispose of
an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions. 19 Frequently,
the court with habeas corpus jurisdiction was remote from the
site of the original trial, rendering the transportation of records,
evidence, and witnesses inconvenient. The reliability of fact-
finding procedures suffered accordingly. Section 2255 was in-
tended to provide federal prisoners a post-conviction remedy in
the forum best suited to handle the proceedings-the forum of
the original trial-with the scope of the remedy identical to that
of habeas corpus.
20
In general, habeas corpus relief has been available in the case
of (1) a conviction rendered by a court without jurisdiction,2 1
(2) a conviction under a statute declared unconstitutional,22 (3)
19. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1952).
20. Id. at 216-17. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus,
8 F.R.D. 171, 175 (1948). In United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-
19 (1952), the Court presented an exhaustive analysis of the intended
scope and purposes behind the enactment of section 2255. "Nowhere in
the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon pris-
oners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions." Id. at 219. See
also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1952).
21. In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107 (1891) (habeas corpus available
where jurisdiction properly lay with the courts of the Cherokee Nation);
Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. 38 (1822) (petition discharged where jurisdic-
tion of convicting court established).
During the period following the Civil War, the notion of "lack of ju-
risdiction" in habeas corpus actions was expanded beyond questions of
personal or subject matter competency. The Court held that convictions
obtained without an indictment by a grand jury or based on an uncon-
stitutional statute exceeded the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Ex
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
One possible explanation for the Court's willingness to expand the con-
cept of jurisdiction during this period is that it lacked appellate jurisdic-
tion over several areas of the federal criminal law. The concept of juris-
diction may have been expanded to enable the Court to review egregious
errors of the circuit courts in areas of the law from which it had been
statutorily excluded. In subsequent years, the concept of jurisdiction
was expanded to permit consideration of the merits of various due pro-
cess claims. Ultimately, in Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), the
Court discarded the fiction of jurisdiction and expressly recognized that
both constitutional claims and questions of jurisdiction were cognizable
in habeas corpus actions. For a more detailed analysis of the changing
concept of jurisdiction, see Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1042-55 (1970).
22. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (conviction based on un-
constitutional statute held cognizable in habeas corpus proceeding). See
also Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
384 (1964).
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infringement by a federal or state court of a constitutional guar-
antee,23 (4) an illegal sentence,24 or (5) exceptional circum-
stances where no other remedy is available.25  Various courts
have recognized the utility of a flexible habeas corpus doc-
trine.26 For this reason, the scope of the writ has not been more
clearly defined. 27 Present uncertainty with respect to the relief
afforded by section 2255 can be attributed in part to this indef-
inite character of its parent doctrine.28  Ambiguities in the lan-
guage of the statute itself, however, have also caused considera-
ble confusion. Under the most convincing interpretation of the
statute's language, two of its provisions appear to be contradic-
tory: the grounds on which a motion for relief may be enter-
tained, as defined in the first paragraph of section 2255, are
broader than the bases for granting relief specified in the third
paragraph. A strict reading of the two provisions suggests that
although a federal prisoner may be entitled to a hearing for any
substantial violation of federal law, relief will be withheld unless
a prejudicial denial of constitutional rights can be shown.29  Al-
23. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (petitioner's claim of de-
nial of due process based on conviction in mob-controlled trial recognized
as ground for habeas corpus); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887) (federal
prisoner held under consecutive sentences based on indictments stating
one charge ordered released).
24. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) (authority of the court to im-
pose penalties not recognized by statute held subject to challenge by ha-
beas corpus).
25. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174,
186 (1947), noted that "[d]efects in jury panel, in trial procedure, exclu-
sion or insufficiency of evidence, are rarely held ground for relief on ha-
beas corpus. But when no other remedy was available and the error ap-
peared flagrant, there have been instances of relief."
26. Id. at 179-80; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939); United
States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1946). See gen-
erally Developments, supra note 21, at 1055-72.
27. See Sunal v. Large, 322 U.S. 174, 187 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
28. Justice Frankfurter suggested the extent to which the scope of
habeas corpus has remained undefined: "I think it is fair to say that
the scope of habeas corpus in the federal courts is an untidy area of our
law that calls for much more systematic consideration than it has thus
far received." Id. at 184.
29. The first paragraph of section 2255 permits a prisoner to move
at any time to vacate his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States." The third paragraph includes "a denial or infringement of the
constitutional rights of the prisoner" as a ground for relief but excludes
the language of the first paragraph referring to sentences "in violation
of the ... laws of the United States." See note 11 supra for the text
of the two paragraphs. In the Davis situation, Justice Rehnquis's read-
ing of the statute would allow relief only if denial of a significant
constitutional right could be shown. 417 U.S. at 357.
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though it is unlikely that Congress intended to allow prisoners to
obtain hearings on grounds for which relief is unavailable, the
difficulty of reconciling the two paragraphs has resulted in sub-
stantial confusion among those interpreting the statute. While
some courts have attempted to determine which paragraph
should control the availability of relief,80 others have chosen to
disregard the statutory provisions entirely.3 1
The -decisional law under section 2255 has been relatively
consistent in dealing with three types of changes in the law after
affirmance of conviction. First, where the change renders uncon-
stitutional the statute under which petitioner has been con-
victed3 2 or makes available a constitutional guarantee denied pe-
30. United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1963), represents
the only opinion to define and explicate adequately the statutory incon-
sistencies in section 2255. After tracing the somewhat circuitous statu-
tory path, Judge Friendly concluded, "[I]t [may] be deemed futile to
endeavor to draw much meaning from the rather murky language of sec-
tion 2255 .... 1" Id. at 322. He arrived at this conclusion after attempt-
ing to decipher the literal language of the statute:
Juxtaposition of the two paragraphs thus suggests a reading that
although any substantial claim of violation of federal "law" . . .
will get a federal prisoner into court under section 2255 in the
sense of giving the court the power and duty to consider his
motion, he can stay there and obtain relief only if he shows ...
that the sentence or judgment is subject to collateral attack,
leaving the meaning of this last phrase to be worked out by the
courts-with an indication that although constitutional rights
stand on a very high plane, not every "denial or infringement"
even of them makes the judgment "vulnerable to collateral
attack." Id. at 322.
Thus, in United States v. Gaitan, 189 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1960),
affd, 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961), petitioner's request for a vacation of
sentence under section 2255 was denied. The court found that the statu-
tory language of the third paragraph prohibited collateral relief based
upon an intervening change in law of a nonconstitutional nature. In Eby
v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Okla. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 319(10th Cir. 1969), the court also refused relief based on an intervening
change in law but cited the motion provision of the first paragraph asjustification. Unfortunately, neither court presented a rationale for
choosing the paragraph it determined to be controlling; the two courts
simply read the statute differently.
31. The fact that relatively few decisions have referred to the stat-
ute itself in defining the scope of relief under section 2255 suggests the
confusion its wording has caused the federal courts. In Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), cited by Justice Rehnquist as one of
the "two most significant section 2255 decisions in recent years," 417 U.S.
at 361, no mention of the statutory language was made in the body of
the opinion. Similarly, in Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), another case regarded as authoritative on the scope of section
2255, consideration of the statutory language was conspicuously avoided.
See also Hayman v. United States, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
32. Professor Amsterdam indicates that "the Supreme Court has
consistently entertained federal prisoners' collateral challenges to the
[Vol. 59:633
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titioner at trial, courts have generally allowed collateral attack
upon a showing of prejudice.3 3  Thus, it has been held that
changes in the law expanding the privilege against self-incrim-
ination,3 4 protecting the right to trial by jury from coercive state
statutory schemes,3 5 securing the right to counsel,36 recognizing
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses,37 or protecting
against double jeopardy38 are properly cognizable in collateral
proceedings under section 2255.
In a second situation, where the change in the law affects
nonconstitutional evidentiary or procedural rules of trial con-
duct, courts 'have denied collateral relief unless the circumstances
presented show substantial prejudice and no other remedy is
available.3 9 Thus, errors of law relating to the sufficiency of
the indictment,40 the admissibility 4' or sufficiency 42 of evidence,
'face' constitutionality of the underlying criminal statute." Amsterdam,
supra note 22, at 384. See Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921); Ex
parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). The writ of habeas corpus was denied
in each case, but the constitutionality of the statute was passed upon by
the Court. See also Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Johnson v.
Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913).
33. An error of law of constitutional magnitude is generally pre-
sumed to be prejudicial to a petitioner. To prevent the reversal of a con-
viction for constitutional error, the prosecution must show beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the alleged error was "harmless." Fahy v. United
States, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
34. Scogin v. United States, 446 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1971); Isaac v.
United States, 293 F. Supp. 1096 (D.S.C. 1968).
35. Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
36. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Tucker v. United
States, 427 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
37. Smith v. United States, 431 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971); Gray v. United States, 407 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1967),
af-fd, 394 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969).
39. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223 (1969); United
States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 1963). Prejudice is thus a
factor common to successful collateral attacks for both constitutional and
nonconstitutional errors of law. While petitioners are generally pre-
sumed to have been prejudiced by constitutional errors, however, see
note 33 supra, petitioners such as Davis, who are affected by nonconstitu-
tional errors, must establish that those errors represent exceptional prej-
udicial circumstances justifying collateral relief, rather than "here errors
of law." "Mere errors of law" is an expression which subsumes a variety
of nonprejudicial substantive and procedural errors that may be commit-
ted by the court during trial. See generally Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174,
185-87 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40. DeMaro v. Willingham, 401 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1968).
41. United States v. Gaitan, 189 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1960), affd,
295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961).
42. Genovese v. United States, 378 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the availability of evidence to counsel,43 and the failure of the
court to offer defendant an opportunity to speak before sentenc-
ing44 have been held insufficient bases for collateral relief in the
absence of a showing of substantial prejudice.
A third line of decisions involves circumstances similar to
those of the petitioner in Davis: the subsequent change in the
law is of a nonconstitutional nature but nonetheless invalidates
the statute under which petitioner has been prosecuted or other-
wise acts as a complete defense to his conviction. In such situa-
tions, relief has generally been granted" because of the injustice
of punishing an individual for an act the law no longer makes
criminal.4 6 For example, in United States v. Kelly,47 the court
43. United States v. Gandia, 255 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1958).
44. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
45. Brough v. United States, 454 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1971); Ramos
v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1970); United States v. Lang-
ford, 315 F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn. 1970); United States v. Kelly, 314 F.
Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). In Brough, petitioner was indicted approxi-
mately five and one-half years after his eighteenth birthday for failing
to register with the selective service. In a subsequent decision, Toussie
v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the
statute of limitations clause applicable in Brough prohibited indictment
unless brought within five years and five days of the individual's eight-
eenth birthday. The court in Brough held that a nonconstitutional inter-
vening change of law of this nature could be raised under section 2255.
In Langford, petitioner was convicted of having knowingly used the
mails for "carriage and delivery" of obscene matter. The Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
altering the standard with respect to the use of obscene materials, was
recognized by the court in Langford as a basis for collateral attack.
Two holdings to the contrary are United States v. Rodgers, 288 F.
Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1968), and Eby v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 387
(N.D. Okla. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1969). Both held that
decisional changes in the law after conviction did not entitle a petitioner
to relief by habeas corpus. Their reliability as precedent is questionable,
however. Both applied principles of res judicata to issues sought to be
raised collaterally. In Eby, for example, petitioner's failure to raise the
issue of self-incrimination on direct appeal was held to foreclose consid-
eration on collateral attack even though the change in law extending the
privilege against self-incrimination had occurred after the exhaustion of
appeals. Several courts have recognized the inapplicability of res judi-
cata to collateral proceedings. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,
7 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963). Moreover, the logic of
requiring an appellant to anticipate a subsequent change in law has been
questioned. See Scogin v. United States, 446 F.2d 416, 419 (8th Cir.
1971). In part, the holdings in Rodgers and Eby may have reflected a
certain reticence on the part of the two district courts to recognize and
apply the newly extended privilege against self-incrimination.
46. The invalidation of a statute by judicial decision, as in Davis,
must be distinguished from invalidation through legislative repeal. Be-
cause the latter has traditionally been considered prospective in nature,
it does not seem unjust to deny collteral relief to a petitioner wh has
[Vol. 59:633
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indicated that "it would be a gross miscarriage of justice to fore-
close this defendant from now challenging his conviction, when,
in the intervening period, the statutes upon which his conviction
was based have been declared void."48  Similarly, in Ramos v.
United States, 49 the court answered affirmatively the question
whether "the criterion for determination of conscientious objector
status [had] been so broadened by subsequent judicial interpre-
tation of existing law.., that it would be a miscarriage of jus-
tice not to review the [petitioner's] classification .... "50
It is clear that the circumstances in Davis were quite similar
to those in Kelly and Ramos. The Fox decision, coming after
the affirmance of Davis's conviction on appeal, had rendered in-
valid the set of regulations on which his conviction had been
based. The change in law was as exceptional as that in Kelly
and Ramos, and continued confinement thereunder was equally
unjust. The Davis Court, however, avoided disposition on the
"exceptional circumstances" ground, clearly intending that it 'be
of secondary importance.5 1 The majority arrived at the princi-
violated a law before its repeal. In essence, such a law was still valid
when violated. On the other hand, a statute declared invalid by a judi-
cial decision applied retroactively is treated as though void from its en-
actment. Though the injustice of continued incarceration under a statute
so invalidated seems more apparent, a near majority of the Court has
failed to find this practice objectionable. See United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 732-33 (1971) (White, J., dissent-
ing).
47. 314 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). The district court applied
Gutknecht and Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460(1970), retroactively in vacating the conviction and sentence, for failure
to report for induction in the armed forces, of the petitioner whose induc-
tion had been accelerated pursuant to the delinquency regulations of the
Selective Service. See note 2 supra. Petitioner had refused to keep re-
quired selective service forms in his possession and had returned them,
along with all correspondence, to his local board.
48. 314 F. Supp. at 504-05.
49. 319 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1970). The court vacated petitioner's
sentence for refusing to report for induction. The Supreme Court deci-
sion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), had interpreted the
criterion for conscientious objector status "so expansively that there
would be no basis in fact for the local board's action if [the] case were
before [the court] for the first time today." 319 F. Supp. at 1219.
50. Id. at 1213.
51. The Davis opinion was constructed in such a manner as to em-
phasize the importance of the majority's principal ground for reversal.
The statutory language in the first paragraph of section 2255 was quoted
four times in the opinion and on each occasion the Court noted that the
provision permits collateral relief for nonconstitutional questions of law.
417 U.S. at 342-45. Mention of the exceptional circumstances ground was
reserved until the close of the opinion and its substantive function was
merely to limit the principal ground. Id.
The majority also avoided a statutory ground that could have pro-
19751
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'pal ground of reversal by interpreting the first paragraph of
section 2255 to permit relief for claims involving questions of
nonconstitutional federal law.52
Whether collateral proceedings are available for nonconstitu-
tional claims has been the subject of some considerable disagree-
ment. 53 As a result, treatment by the federal courts of petition-
ers asserting such claims has been somewhat disparate." Many
of the courts granting relief in such situations 55 have relied on
the questionable dicta of two section 2255 opinions.56 The Davis
vided a disposition similar to that under the exceptional circumstances
doctrine. The language in paragraph 3 of section 2255 permitting relief
from "a sentence.. . otherwise open to collateral attack" is similar in
purpose to that of the judicially developed exceptional circumstances
rule. The majority described the former as a "catch all" phrase designed
to provide relief where substantial prejudice is shown, id. at 344, but
never explicitly acknowledged that this language could have been dis-
positive in the Davis circumstances. That both grounds were available
but bypassed suggests that the Court was intent on using a broader ra-
tionale to justify relief.
52. An argument can be made that the majority's use of the word
"laws" to encompass federal decisional law is a departure from the origi-
nal meaning of the term. The language of section 2255 regarding sen-
tences in violation of the "laws" of the United States can be traced di-
rectly to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (repealed
1868). The term "law" in the Act of 1867 may have referred to all fed-
eral rules outside the Constitution or only to federal statutes. But, ac-
cording to the view prevailing at the time the Act was adopted, "in the
ordinary use of the language, it will hardly be contended that the deci-
sions of the Courts constitute laws." Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1, 18 (1842). See United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 321 n.4 (2d Cir.
1965). The modern approach of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), however,
does treat federal decisions as "law." The approach to be taken to sec-
tion 2255 was an unresolved question prior to Davis. Justice Rehnquist,
in his dissenting opinion, preferred the traditional approach of Swift with
"some allowance for judicial lawmaking." 417 U.S. at 359-60. Rejecting
such a limited interpretation, the majority apparently adopted the mod-
ern approach of Erie and York.
The approach taken by Justice Rehnquist can be attacked on the
ground that the Court in Swift v. Tyson misinterpreted the intent of the
framers of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. The interpretation of
"laws" allegedly incorporated into the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 incor-
rectly excluded judicial decisions from the word's definition. It was this
argument, in part, that provided the basis for the eventual overruling of
Swift. See Warren, New Light On the History Of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. Rsv. 49 (1923).
53. See Developments, supra note 21, at 1067-69.
54. Compare Foster v. United States, 345 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1965),
and Holt v. United States, 303 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 970 (1963), with Brough v. United States, 454 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1971), and United States v. Sorenson, 308 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. See Tucker v. United States, 427 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Sorenson, 308 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
56. In Davis, the majority interprets as holdings statements from
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majority correctly rejected the distinction traditionally drawn
between constitutional and nonconstitutional issues with respect
to the availability of collateral proceedings 57 and prohibited the
summary dismissal of nonconstitutional claims.58 In accordance
with decisional law prior to Davis,9 the majority did not extend
the availability of collateral relief to nonprejudicial errors of
law: the Court suggested that the circumstances of each petition
must be considered to determine whether the claimed error of
law is so exceptional as to justify resort to habeas corpus.60 But
the mere fact that a contention is based on "the laws," rather
than the Constitution, of the United States would not preclude
its assertion in a section 2255 proceeding. 61
The Court's decision to reject the distinction between consti-
tutional and nonconstitutional issues is consistent with the poli-
cies underlying the availability of collateral rehef. Courts grant-
ing collateral petitions have generally focused on both the degree
of prejudice to the petitioner 62 and the availability of normal
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), and Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969):
In Sanders, the Court held inter alia, that even though the legal
issue raised in a § 2255 motion "was determined against [the
applicant] on the merits on a prior application," "the applicant
may [nevertheless] be entitled to a new hearing upon show-
ing an intervening change in the law .... " The same rule
applies when the prior determination was made on direct appeal
from the applicant's conviction, instead of in an earlier § 2255
proceeding, "if new law has been made ... since the trial and
appeal." [citing Kaufman]
417 U.S. at 342. Neither were holdings in the strict sense of the word.
Moreover, though both cases dealt with claims of a constitutional nature
concededly within the reach of section 2255, the majority cites each as
controlling in the Davis situation where the change of law at issue was
nonconstitutional. For a discussion of the Kaufman dictum, see Develop-
ments, supra note 21, at 1067-69.
57. See, e.g., Lothridge v. United States, 441 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1003 (1971); DeMaro v. Willingham, 401 F.2d 105
(7th Cir. 1968); Genovese v. United States, 378 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1967).
58. For examples of the type of summary disposition the Court
sought to prevent, see United States v. Rodgers, 288 F. Supp. 57 (W.D.
Okla. 1968), and Eby v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Okla. 1968),
affd, 415 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1969).
59. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 186 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
60. 417 U.S. at 346.
61. Id. at 346-47.
62. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813
(1946). For examples of violationm of specific constitutional rights as
grounds for habeas corpus, see Sunal v. Large, supra at 185-86 (Frankfur-
ter, J., dissenting). The need for a detailed review of the evidence would
seem less acute in a Davis-type situation as the issues on appeal require
legal, rather than factual, findings.
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appellate procedures to rectify the error.0 3 Certainly there is
no ineluctable relationship between the constitutional nature of
the claim raised and the degree of prejudice suffered. A peti-
tioner may indeed be more prejudiced by a nonconstitutional er-
ror than by one of a constitutional nature.64
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Davis, attacked the decision
of the majority to abandon the distinction between constitutional
and nonconstitutional issues as an unwarranted expansion of col-
lateral relief which would increase the caseload of the already
overburdened federal courts.65 Other authorities have asserted
that a further broadening of the availability of habeas corpus
may adversely affect the administration of the federal court sys-
tem in a number of ways.6 6 When limited by the exceptional
circumstances doctrine, however, the decision in Davis does not
represent a significant expansion of grounds for relief under sec-
tion 2255. Moreover, the impact of recognizing nonconstitutional
claims can be further limited if the availability of relief is con-
trolled by an effective rule of waiver. In the absence of adequate
justification, petitioners who have deliberately 'bypassed avail-
able appellate -procedures should be 'held to have waived their
right to collateral attack.67
63. Frequently, the Court has stated that habeas corpus cannot do
service for appeal from conviction in the federal courts. Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947) (deliberate bypass of the appeal process in favor
of collateral proceedings held ground for denying collateral relief). It
is well settled that matters given full consideration on direct appeal will
not be relitigated in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Castellana v.
United States, 378 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1967). Where petitioner is unable
on appeal to assert a particular ground later made available to him by
a change in law or where the bypassing is deliberate but for a justifiable
reason, relief through collateral proceedings has been granted. See, e.g.,
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (choice by defendant not to appeal heldjustified, since an appeal would have risked a heavier penalty).
64. For example, a petitioner may be substantially more prejudiced
by denial of a nonconstitutional claim based on the sufficiency of an
indictment than by denial of a constitutional claim relating to defend-
ant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Few errors are more
prejudicial than one in which a change in law renders invalid a regula-
tion upon which conviction was based. Compare DeMaro v. Willingham,
401 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1968), with Smith v. United States, 431 F.2d 1 (8th
Cir. 1970), and United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1963).
65. 417 U.S. at 364.
66. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHr. L. REv.
142 (1970); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post Conviction Remedy for
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960); Developments, supra note
21.
67. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181 (1947); Developments,
supra note 21, at 1070. But see Friendly, supra note 66, at 159-60.
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Whether the opinion in Davis will be confined to its narrow
holding in subsequent interpretation by the federal courts is a
matter of some concern. 3 The analysis of the Court lacks ade-
quate reference to factually consistent case law, convincing statu-
tory language, or reasoned policy grounds.6 9 Under an inaccu-
rate, but highly probable, interpretation of the majority opinion,
the grounds for collateral attack could be expanded by reference
to the nonconstitutional issue language without mention of the
exceptional circumstances limitation. Had the Court adequately
supported its position, the likelihood of such expansive interpre-
tations by lower federal courts would have been lessened consid-
erably.
Decisions tending to broaden the scope of habeas corpus have
been attacked on the ground that the factfinding process in col-
lateral proceedings is considerably less reliable than that in the
original trial.70 It is illogical, however, to deny collateral attack
to prisoners able to make a minimal showing of innocence be-
cause of the difficulty of retrial.71 The problem is basically one
of court administration and the appropriate solution therefore
would be to reform administrative procedures rather than to
deny substantive rights.
Expansion of the availability of collateral relief has also been
criticized as undermining fundamental aims of the criminal
law. 72 Deterrent and rehabilitative functions are advanced if the
convict realizes soon after his incarceration
that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of
rehabilitation; and a process of reeducation cannot . . . begin
... if society . . . continuously tells the convict that he may
not be justly subject to reeducation and treatment in the first
place.7 3
At some point judgments must become final so as to prevent
68. The recent case of United States v. Travers, No. 74-1737 (2d Cir.,
Dec. 16, 1974), suggests that federal courts may be slow to expand upon
the Davis Court's narrow holding. In Travers, the court held that "ex-
ceptional circumstances" justifying collateral relief under section 2255
were presented by the Government's failure to establish an element of
the offense of conspiracy, the proof of which was required by a subse-
quent judicial decision. Writing for the majority, Judge Friendly ex-
pressly acknowledged the exceptional circumstances limitation on the
holding in Davis. Id. at 814.
69. See 417 U.S. at 342-46.
70. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1965); Friendly,
supra note 66, at 147-48.
71. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 383-84; Developments, supra
note 21, at 1059.
72. See generally Bator, supra note 66.
73. Id. at 452.
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repeated petitioning for post-conviction relief. It is clear, how-
ever, that such concerns are inapplicable to petitioners able to
show substantial prejudice from the error alleged. 74 It would
seem a difficult task, indeed, to convince an individual confined
under a regulation subsequently held invalid "that he is justly
subject to sanction." If an offender feels the system has treated
him unfairly, he may develop a resentment and disrespect for
it that impairs his "reeducation and treatment," thereby retard-
ing the rehabilitation process.
Accordingly, the Davis decision, limited to its narrow hold-
ing, is clearly consistent with the policies underlying the availa-
bility of collateral relief. The majority's failure to support its
decision adequately, however, may result in expansive lower
court interpretations recognizing nonconstitutional claims which
do not prejudice the petitioner as totally as the intervening
change in the law in Davis. Interpreted in this way, the Court's
position would be more difficult to defend.
74. Professor Amsterdam lists a number of aims of the criminal law
which are undermined by the present availability of post-conviction
remedies. Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 383-84. As an example, he cites
"delay in setting the criminal procedures to rest," id. at 383, but he rec-
ognizes that none of the elements of finality are significantly offended
by a petition to redress a conviction under a statute unconstitutional on
its face. He indicates that "[r]epose in convictions under a constitution-
ally unauthorized statute, however, does not serve the deterrent or reha-
bilitative purposes of the criminal law." Id. at 384 n.30. There is no
reason to suppose that his conclusion would be different with respect to
a statute invalid on nonconstitutional grounds.
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